Legal Principles Contract Law

Contracts are promises that the law will enforce. Contract law is generally governed by the common law of the states and, although general contract law is common throughout the country, some specific judicial interpretations of a particular element of the contract may vary from state to state. By following these six principles, you will ensure that your agreement is legally binding and offers the protection and outcome you expect. The egalitarianism of contract law at the institutional level faces two common criticisms. First, it is not clear that judges have the authority or competence to promote distributive justice. A tax and benefit system may be a more effective means of promoting the interests of the economically disadvantaged than private law, although whether this is true remains an open empirical question (Kaplow & Shavell 1994; Lucy, 2007: 352–6; Lisbon 2021 [Other Internet Resources]). Second, contract disputes are a private matter, and people deserve to be protected from the burdens associated with the moral responsibility of the community. Thomas Nagel (1991: ch9) describes a moral division of labour between the institutional actors responsible for the basic legal structure and ordinary citizens acting in their private capacity. In general, people can live a better life if they are freed from the obligation to manage their exchange relationships altruistically. However, the point seems consistent since courts are obliged to charge negative rates – for example, a duty not to exploit the community`s inability to provide distributive justice (Murphy 1998:266; Bagchi, 2014). The unscrupulous doctrine of the common law seems tailor-made to control this type of theft by the economically privileged of the disadvantaged. There are two main ways of being in breach of contract: contract and property law, as well as tax and transfer institutions, arguably fall within the „basic structure” of society, that is, the category of institutions that affect people`s lives so pervasively that they require special justification (Murphy 1998: 260-261).

For Rawls, the justification for the basic structure depends on the parties who would rationally agree if they ignored various aspects of their situation, including their economic situation. Rawlsian „maximine principles” prioritize the interests of those who are most ill-off. Although a comprehensive analysis of Rawls` work and its impact on modern contract theory is beyond the scope of this article, readers may wish to consult the related entries (on distributive justice and the original position) for more details. Contracts are mainly governed by state law and general (judicial) law and private law (i.e. private agreement). Private law essentially includes the terms of the agreement between the parties exchanging promises. This private law may prevail over many of the rules otherwise established by state law. Statutory laws, such as fraud law, may require certain types of contracts to be recorded in writing and executed with certain formalities for the contract to be enforceable. Alternatively, the parties may enter into a binding agreement without signing a formal written document. For example, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled in Lucy v. Zehmer that even an agreement reached on a piece of napkin can be considered a valid contract if the parties were both healthy and showed mutual consent and consideration. Finally, normative assumptions from the economic point of view have been criticized.

Dworkin (1975:1061) argues that judges should decide bilateral disputes on the basis of the established rights of the parties and considerations of interpersonal equity, while the development of rules based on the common good should be left „to the political system of representative democracy.” The economic approach seems to ignore these limits of judicial authority. Another normative critique (which is discussed more broadly in the entry on economic philosophy) aims at the definition of well-being, which animates work in this field. Economists tend to equate party welfare with preference gratification, while inferring the strength of preferences based on willingness to pay. This approach distorts efficiency measures in favour of the rich, as willingness to pay is sensitive to basic equipment (Liscow 2018). In contractual exchanges, an approach to maximizing preferential satisfaction is at least more or less constrained by the Pareto criterion (an outcome is considered a Pareto improvement only if it is preferred by at least one person and rejected by a person), since both parties must agree to each contract before it becomes enforceable. But again, the equivalence between preference satisfaction and well-being remains open to criticism because it is based on an impoverished representation of the social good (Radin, 1987; Murphy, 2014; Mullen, 2016). A related set of rules determines which basic contract text is to be interpreted and which evidence determines its meaning. The Parol Evidence Rule („PER”) establishes a preference for writings over earlier or contemporary oral agreements (UCC: §2-202).

The rule implies in its traditional declaration that if a document exists, oral agreements (which may be derived from the declaration) that are „extrinsic” to the „four corners of the document” are not part of the contract.