Legal Proof in Law

The main reason why this high standard of proof is required in criminal proceedings is that such a trial can lead to the deprivation of liberty or even death of an accused. These results are much more serious than in civil litigation, where financial damages are the usual remedy. Today, it is assumed that all persons are qualified to testify in trials and other judicial proceedings, and it is also assumed that all persons are required by law to appear as witnesses when their testimony is requested. FRE 601 However, legislation sometimes exempts individuals from the obligation to testify, and legislation prohibits people from testifying in certain circumstances. In one interpretation, the standard of proof is a probabilistic threshold. In civil cases, the standard is „balance of probabilities” or, as it is more commonly known in the United States, „balance of evidence.” The applicant will meet this standard and will only succeed if, based on all the evidence presented in the case, there is a greater than 0.5 probability that his or her claim is true. In criminal trials, the standard for a guilty verdict is „proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Here, it is assumed that the probabilistic threshold is much higher than 0.5, but the courts have avoided any authoritative attempt at quantification. Typically, a fictitious value, such as 0.9 or 0.95, is assumed by the authors for discussion purposes. For the prosecution to reach a guilty verdict, the evidence presented at trial must support the criminal charge with a probability greater than this threshold. If, as in the United States, there is an intermediate standard for „clear and convincing evidence” reserved for special cases, the probability threshold should be somewhere between 0.5 and the threshold for evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.

In Section 3.1, we focused on the weight of evidence in terms of the weight of evidence of individual evidence. The concept of weight may also apply to all evidence presented at trial; Here, „weight” is commonly referred to as „sufficiency of evidence.” [14] The law allocates the legal burden of proof between the disputing parties. For example, in criminal proceedings, the presumption of innocence of the accused applies and the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove guilt. In order to obtain a conviction, the evidence presented at trial must be sufficient to meet the standard of proof. As a general rule, a judgment is in favour of the party bearing the legal burden of proof only if the factual intermediary is satisfied, after taking into account all the evidence, that the applicable standard of proof is met. The standard of proof has been interpreted differently. Critics of the mathematization of legal evidence cite this point as an example of the inherent limitations of mathematical modeling of probative value (Allen and Pardo 2007a). [13] Allen and Pardo propose an alternative, the explanatory theory of legal evidence. They argue that this theory has the advantage of avoiding the reference class problem because it does not attempt to quantify probative value (Pardo 2005: 374-383; Pardo and Allen, 2008: 261, 263; Pardo 2013: 600-601). Suppose a man is accused of killing his wife.

Evidence of his extramarital affair is presented. The unique probative value of the accused`s infidelity cannot be calculated mathematically from the basic statistical rates of infidelity and uxoricides (husbands who murder women). In assessing their probative value, the court should instead pay attention to the extent to which the evidence of embezzlement supports the explanation of the material events advanced by the probative party and the extent to which it calls into question the explanation given by the opposing party. For example, the prosecution could present evidence to support their argument that the accused wanted to get rid of his wife so that he could marry his mistress, and the defence could argue the alternative theory that the couple was unusual in that they tolerated extramarital affairs and never allowed it to interfere with their romantic relationship. The probative value of the evidence of infidelity depends on the strength of the explanatory links between it and competing hypotheses, which cannot be quantified. 70. Neither the seriousness of the allegation nor the seriousness of the consequences should be distinguished from the standard of proof to be applied in establishing the facts. Inherent probabilities are simply something to consider when deciding where the truth lies. Proponents of the mathematical conception of the standard of evidence have stood firm, although they have recognized that weight plays a role in Bayesian analysis of the weight of evidence and sufficiency.

If a party does not present relevant evidence in its possession, resulting in a lack of evidence in the court, it may draw an adverse inference against it when calculating probability after the fact (Kaye, 1986b: 667; Friedman, 1997). One criticism of this approach is that, in the absence of information on lack of evidence, the adverse conclusion is open to the objection of arbitrariness (Nance 2008:274). Another objection is that the management of the parties` conduct with respect to the preservation and presentation of evidence should be left to the judges and not to the jury. What a judge can do to maximize the weight of evidence is to impose a burden of proof on a party and bring the party to an adverse finding of fact if they do not present the evidence. This encourages the party to act in a manner that promotes the value of completeness of evidence (Nance 2008, 2010, 2016). Even if the theory is correct, it does not necessarily follow that the exclusion rules should be abolished once the jury system is abolished. Judges may be just as sensitive to the same cognitive and other impairments as the jury, and there may be an additional risk that judges will overestimate their own cognitive and intellectual abilities in their professional field. Therefore, the constraints of legal rules remain necessary (Schauer 2006: 185-193). But the effectiveness of these rules in a non-jury system is questionable. The procedural reality is that judges must be exposed to evidence in order to decide their admissibility. Given that a judge cannot reasonably be expected to erase the evidence from his mind once he has decided to exclude it, it seems unnecessary to exclude the evidence; We might as well let the evidence in and allow the judge to give the evidence the probative value it deserves (Mnookin 2006; Damaška, 2006; cf. Ho 2008: 44-46).

Given that the relevant utility depends on individual circumstances, such as the seriousness of the offence and the severity of the sentence, the adjudicative theoretical presentation of the standard of proof in both the simple and amended versions seems to lead to the conclusion that the probabilistic threshold should vary from case to case (Lillquist, 2002; Bartels, 1981; Laudan and Saunders, 2009; Ribeiro, 2019).