If lawyers do not agree on the criteria for legal validity, the grounds for validity cannot be exhausted by the common criteria of a recognition rule. The semantic stab therefore implies that the notion of legal validity must be more than what can be explained by promulgation according to common criteria enshrined in a rule of recognition. He can illustrate the philosophical stakes of legal positivism by comparing it to a number of other theses with which he is sometimes wrongly identified, and not only by his opponents (see also Hart 1958, Führer 1996 and Schauer 1996). According to Fuller, no system of rules that does not at least respect these principles of legality can achieve the essential purpose of the law, which is to achieve social order through the use of rules that guide behavior. A system of rules that doesn`t meet (P2) or (P4), for example, can`t control behavior because people can`t determine what the rules require. Accordingly, Fuller concludes that his eight principles are „internal” to law in the sense that they are embedded in the conditions of existence of law: „Total failure in one of these eight directions does not simply lead to a bad legal system; it leads to something that is not called a legal system at all” (Fuller 1964, p. 39). Although all positivists agree that there are possible legal systems without moral limits to legal validity, there are conflicting views on whether there are possible legal systems with such restrictions. According to inclusive positivism (also known as incorporationism and soft positivism), it is possible that the rule of recognition of a society implies moral limits on the content of the law. Celebrities, including positivists, include Jules Coleman and H.L.A.
Hart, who asserts that „the rule of recognition as a criterion of legal validity may include conformity with moral principles or material values. such as the Sixteenth or Nineteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which respects the establishment of religion or the restriction of the right to vote” (Hart, 1994, p. 250). According to Dworkin, the thesis of the discretion of positivism is engaged in the third sense of discretion, which he calls strong discretion. According to Dworkin, the thesis that judges have discretion only in the sense that they exercise judgment is trivially true, while the thesis that judges have discretion in the sense that their decisions cannot be overturned by a superior court is false. Even the Supreme Court can be struck down by Congress or by a constitutional amendment. According to Dworkin, the discretionary thesis implies that judges have the discretion to decide difficult cases, which amounts to a legal act because the judge is not bound by any legal norm. If the legal arguments are primarily, or even partially, about [the characteristics that make a proposition valid], then not all lawyers can use the same factual criteria to decide when legal propositions are true and false. Their arguments would revolve mainly or partly around the criteria they should use. The project of semantic theories, the project of unearthing common rules from a careful study of what jurists say and do, would thus be doomed to failure (Dworkin 1986, p. 43).
Legal positivism has a long history and great influence. It has precursors in ancient political philosophy and is discussed in medieval legal and political thought, and the term itself is introduced (see Finnis 1996). Modern teaching, however, owes little to these ancestors. Its most important roots lie in the political philosophies of Hobbes and Hume, and its first complete elaboration is due to Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), whose narrative Austin adopted, modified and popularized. For much of the next century, an amalgam of their views, according to which law is the imperative of a ruler supported by force, dominated philosophical reflection on law. By the mid-twentieth century, however, this narrative had lost its influence among active legal philosophers. His focus on legislative institutions has been replaced by a focus on law enforcement institutions such as the courts, and his emphasis on the role of coercive power has given way to theories emphasizing the systematic and normative nature of law. The most important architects of contemporary legal positivism are the Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) and the two dominant figures of analytic legal philosophy, H.L.A. Hart (1907-92) and Joseph Raz, among whom there are clear lines of influence, but also important contrasts. However, the importance of legal positivism is not limited to the philosophy of law. This can be seen throughout social theory, especially in the works of Marx, Weber and Durkheim, and also in many jurists, including American „legal realists” and most contemporary feminist academics.
Although they disagree on many other points, these authors all recognize that the law is essentially a matter of social fact. Some of them are uncomfortable with the label of „legal positivism” and therefore hope to escape it. Their discomfort is sometimes the product of confusion. Lawyers often use the term „positivist” offensively to condemn a formalist doctrine that the law is always clear and, no matter how foolish or erroneous, must be rigorously enforced by officials and followed by subjects. It is doubtful that anyone has ever had this view, but it is definitely wrong and has nothing to do with legal positivism. Among those educated in philosophy, another, more understandable misunderstanding can be disturbing. Legal positivism is sometimes associated here with homonymic teachings but independent of logical positivism (the meaning of a sentence is its mode of verification) or sociological positivism (social phenomena can only be studied by the methods of the natural sciences). While there are historical connections and temperament similarities between these ideas, they are substantially different. The idea that the existence and content of law ultimately depend on social facts is not based on any particular semantic thesis and is compatible with a number of theories on how to study the social world, including non-naturalistic representations. To say that the existence of law depends on facts and not on its merits is a thesis on the relationship between laws, facts and merits, not a thesis on the individual relationship. Therefore, many traditional moral teachings of „natural law”—including belief in universal and objective morality based on human nature—do not contradict legal positivism.
The only influential positivist moral theories are the views that moral standards are valid only if they have a source in divine commandments or social conventions. Such theists and relativists apply to morality the constraints that legal positivists consider to be the law.